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 NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU1
Caroline de la Porte, Philippe Pochet, Graham Room ∗
ABSTRACT
The European Union has established an “open method of coordination” (OMC) among
the Member States, as a means of pursuing economic and employment growth, coupled
with greater social cohesion. The paper analyses the assumptions underlying this strategy,
the manner of its operation and its implications for policy learning and for governance. It
argues that the OMC has in substantial measure been inspired by the experience of EMU,
but that this is a perilous paradigm on which to base social benchmarking and the OMC.
Second, it argues that the dynamic development of the OMC will depend crucially on the
extent of public involvement in scrutinising the policy areas which political leaders choose
for benchmarking, the best practices which they identify in other Member States, and the
efforts which they then make to improve national performance. The conclusion is that the
OMC is likely to have substantial implications for domestic and European governance, but
that these could be very different, depending on the manner of its implementation.  Finally,
the paper considers the implications of the analysis for the broader theoretical literature.
Keywords: Benchmarking, EU policy-making, governance, social indicators, policy
learning
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1. Introduction
During the Lisbon Summit of March 2000, the European Union (EU) set itself the
goal of becoming “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the
world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater
social cohesion”. To reach this strategic aim, the open method of coordination (OMC), a
de-centralised but carefully coordinated process, has been established. This article
addresses some of the questions raised by this method of coordination, as well as its policy
implications. What are the tools and processes associated with OMC? How can the
frameworks to which it is applied be differentiated? And in what degree does OMC
introduce changes to the governance of the EU? The paper retraces the precursors and
principal sources of influences on OMC, notably monetary union and the European
Employment Strategy, using these as points of comparison for the social benchmarking
that has evolved since the Lisbon Summit. It considers the implications of social
benchmarking and policy co-ordination for policy learning and EU governance in general.
It concludes that the OMC is likely to have substantial implications for domestic and
European governance, but that these could be very different, depending on the manner of
its implementation.
Several lines of theoretical discussion, in the wider academic literature, are of
particular interest for the argument of the paper.  First, the OMC is a form of policy
coordination, albeit within a polity endowed with a variety of intergovernmental and
supranational modes of decision-making, and can therefore be viewed by reference to the
substantial literature on policy coordination.  Second, it can also be related to the
literature on organisational learning, cross-national policy transfer and lesson-drawing.
Third, the international relations literature has studied the institutional conditions for
securing international cooperation and the strategies which national and sub-national
actors can pursue within this institutional arena.  Finally, there is a growing theoretical
literature on the governance of supranational and international institutions.  It is to these
broader discussions that we turn in the final section of the paper.
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2. The instruments of “new governance”: benchmarking and the open
method of coordination
2.1 Benchmarking
A benchmark is defined as “a standard or point of reference against which things may
be compared or assessed” (Pearsall, 1999: 125). Benchmarks must be chosen by reference
to the objectives of an organisation, whether it is commercial or public. This is because
benchmarking is a tool by which an organisation assesses how well it is meeting its
objectives and how they could be met even more effectively. More specifically,
benchmarking involves comparing how an organisation is doing relative to its peers. It is
therefore most obviously done by reference to organisations which have identical, or at
least similar, objectives. However, even where the objectives are similar, benchmarking
risks ignoring differences in the context of the organisations being compared. Lesson-
drawing based principally on benchmarking is therefore hazardous (Lundvall and
Tomlinson, 2001).
Benchmarking can be initiated by the organisation itself (‘bottom-up’), or it can be
imposed from above and outside (‘top-down’). The former involves searching for best
practices, organisational learning and continuous improvement in order to eliminate
performance gaps. The latter, in contrast, involves a variety of quality assurance policies
and the dissemination of findings in order to improve performance across the sector
(Tronti, 1998: 10.1.1.1-10.1.1.3). The former allows each organisation to choose those
benchmarks which are appropriate to its own specific objectives; the latter assumes that all
the organisational units in question have the same objectives, and can be scrutinised by
reference to the same benchmarks.
2.2 Benchmarking Social Europe: The Open Method of Coordination (OMC)
The use of benchmarking as “an instrument to promote change and continuous
improvement of Europe’s competitive performance” was developed in 1996, with the
Communication “Benchmarking the Competitiveness of European Industry” (CEC, 1996)
and in 1997 with the Communication “Benchmarking: Implementation of an instrument
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available to economic actors and public authorities” (CEC, 1997).  This built upon work by
the Round Table of European Industrialists (ERT, 1996).
During the European Council of Lisbon, in March 2000, benchmarking became part
of a more complex and comprehensive strategy, the OMC, introduced to promote the
development of the knowledge-based economy, in tandem with increased social cohesion
and employment (Council of the European Union, 2000: 4). It was emphasised that OMC
should be conceived as a “learning process for all”, which should respect national diversity
and should not be seen as a competition in the overall context of adapting to the global
context. OMC has its own logic and can be seen as a compromise between a logic of pure
integration and a logic of simple cooperation.
The conclusions of the Lisbon Council stipulate that the new open method of
coordination is a means of spreading best practice and of achieving thereby greater
convergence. It involves:
• fixing guidelines for the Union, combined with specific timetables for achieving the
goals which they set in the short, medium and long terms;
• establishing, where appropriate, quantitative and qualitative indicators and benchmarks
against the best in the world and tailored to the needs of different Member States and
sectors, as a means of comparing best practice;
• translating these European guidelines into national and regional policies by setting
specific targets and adopting measures, taking into account national and regional
differences;
• periodic monitoring, evaluation and peer review, organised as mutual learning
processes (European Council, 2000).
In this process, the Commission is meant to play a co-ordinating role, by presenting
proposals on the European guidelines, organising the exchange of best practices,
presenting proposals on potential indicators, and providing support to the processes of
implementation and peer review (This in turn raises the important question of the new
balance of power between the intergovernmental and supranational players in the EU:
however, this is beyond the scope of the present paper).
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In the documents emanating from the Council and the Commission, OMC is
conceived as an instrument for deepening European integration, in conjunction with other
instruments, ranging from harmonisation to loose cooperation. The overall aim is to
organise a European level process of acquiring knowledge, with a view to encouraging
Member States to exchange best practices and to learn from them, so as to improve their
own national policies (Council of the European Union, 2000: 5). The development of
organised and reciprocal learning processes to cope with the key stakes of a rapidly
changing world is at the heart of the method. While OMC has recourse to benchmarking, it
goes beyond this by defining European level guidelines and identifying common
challenges, even if the formulation of the response to the challenges remains the
responsibility of Member States.
The Council and the Commission also intend that OMC should involve all the relevant
stakeholders: the Union, the Member States, the local and regional collectivities, as well as
the social partners and civil society. It is also meant to improve transparency and deepen
democratic participation, one of the key objectives of the European Union, as indicated in
the work programme of the forthcoming White Paper on European Governance.
The dominant discourse on the OMC presents it as the ideal application of the
subsidiarity principle, in the framework of which the European level plays a minor role.
However, upon deeper analysis, this complementarity between OMC and subsidiarity is
less clear. Whereas subsidiarity defines the level of power that is the most appropriate for
each sphere of action, OMC recognises the interrelation between different spheres,
promoting interaction between different levels of power and spheres of action. Moreover,
the principle of subsidiarity is often associated with the principle of proximity, according to
which decisions should be taken as close as possible to the grass-roots level, while OMC
underlines the need to proceed via a widely meshed interactive process, in which the actors
– ranging from European to local level – have to articulate their strategy and actions in a
multi-level logic (see Pochet, 2001).
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3. Application of the instruments of new governance to different
policy areas
3.1 The Precursors
We will now consider how OMC, benchmarking and the other instruments of new
governance are being interpreted and applied in selected policy areas. However, it is first
worth noticing their most important precursors, in the fields of monetary and employment
policy.
Monetary Union
Under the terms of the Treaty on European Union, the drive for monetary union
involved a set of common objectives to “ensure sustained convergence of the economic
performances of Member States” (article 99 TEU), with benchmarks of fiscal and
monetary performance, to be attained as a precondition of EMU membership and then to
be maintained. Under the terms of the Stability and Growth Pact of 1996, monetary
sovereignty is pooled and in regards to their overall fiscal balances, countries are
accountable to multilateral surveillance and supranational governance, with financial
sanctions attached. Indeed, each Member State of the euro zone has been required to
submit a three-year convergence programme, to be examined by the Commission and by
its peers. To support this process, the broad economic policy guidelines set out priorities
and recommendations for the euro-zone as a whole as well as more specifically for each
Member State. Financial sanctions have only been foreseen in the case of non-compliance
with the ceiling rate of a 3% budget deficit fixed by the Council. Sanctions for non-
compliance with other objectives or recommendations –such as the reduction of the global
public debt – take the form of pressure by peers, the financial markets and public opinion.
However, before taking this as the benchmark by reference to which other
benchmarking exercises can be judged, the distinctive features of this monetary regime
must be noted. Most obviously, it was achieved under German monetary hegemony: the
governance of their anchor currency would henceforth be pooled, but according to
benchmarks and disciplines that the German monetary authorities would primarily define.
Whether or not a coherent system of benchmarking can or should be attempted in other
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fields, in the absence of a hegemonic power or coalition, is a question that will be discussed
below. It is also important to notice that even while a common monetary regime was
imposed, the institutional contexts of the various countries differed, as did the economic,
political and institutional changes that were required, in order to attain the monetary
benchmarks. Thus, for example, the development of national social pacts proved
particularly important for those countries which faced difficulty in sustaining the new
monetary regime (Fajertag and Pochet, 2000). The benchmarks may have been uniform,
but the consequences of their application for the different countries concerned were very
different.
At least two additional lessons can be drawn from the EMU process. First of all,
national adaptations to the common regime were made due to the pressures for
convergence upon national systems and elites. This pressure is transposable to other
contexts, and is notably one of the driving forces behind the employment strategy.
Secondly, the political and bureaucratic elites have not hesitated to use EMU as a pretext
(vincolo esterno is the term used by Dyson and Featherstone, 1996) to make politically
sensitive changes that would otherwise have been too difficult to implement. Indeed,
Europe has been considered as a valuable political resource to legitimise change (Ferrera
and Gualmini, 1999).
Employment and the Luxembourg Process
It was in considerable measure as a “spillover” from these difficulties in adapting to
the monetary and fiscal demands of EMU that concerted action to address persisting
problems of unemployment was accepted as a political imperative during the mid-1990s. A
first attempt to define the contours of a European Employment Strategy was made during
the European Council of Essen (December 1994). After its failure, mainly due to the
absence of a control process (peer review), a second attempt was made during the
intergovernmental conference, leading to the signature of the Amsterdam treaty (1997) and
its employment chapter. The underlying logic consisted of mimicking the EMU process.
This included the institutional set-up: an employment committee, with an advisory role for
the Labour and Social Affairs Council, was created to counterbalance the economic policy
committee, which advises the Ecofin Council. Thus the benchmark of the employment
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strategy was EMU: the key difference was the lack of sanctions in case of non-compliance
(Goetschy and Pochet, 1997).
The process is based on guidelines that provide a margin for adaptation at national
level, but which also involve a process of benchmarking, multilateral surveillance and peer
review. Member States are encouraged to transpose the specific policy objectives in the
Employment Guidelines to national level programmes in regard to their particular socio-
economic circumstances. To illustrate their efforts, they submit an annual report. The
Commission and the Labour and Social Affairs Council in turn synthesise the national
reports and make an annual assessment of progress overall, as well as of the individual
Member States. In this light, the Labour and Social Affairs Council adapts the guidelines,
issues recommendations to Member States and decides upon new initiatives at Community
level. This process is repeated on an annual basis, becoming a governance process in its
own right: something that helps to explain why it has been spreading to other policy areas,
in the framework of the open method of coordination (Goetschy,1999).
The process has not been tension-free. Indeed, although the European Employment
Guidelines or recommendations issued to specific Member States do not have a binding
character, the yearly categorisation of the performance of each country individually has
proved to be an uncomfortable finger-pointing session, putting pressure on the Member
States to converge towards the benchmark that has been selected as the ideal goal to
achieve. In order to improve their respective situations in the overall competition, some
countries need to implement structural reforms, which are not necessarily in tune with their
dominant national policy objectives or traditions.
Therefore, even if there has been a political resurgence of social democracy across the
EU Member States, it has been no easy matter to find sufficient agreement on common
objectives and guidelines for this benchmarking exercise. Still less has there been consensus
on the policy measures to be undertaken. This is, of course, a general question in relation
to benchmarking: the benchmark may be agreed, but not the means to pursue it. In
contrast to the monetary area, there is in the case of employment policy no hegemon to
issue definitive rulings, nor indeed are there explicit sanctions to enforce compliance
(although the political opprobrium that attaches to those who do not play according to the
rules of the game can be very powerful).
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However, even in the absence of hegemony, it has been possible for the Member
States to agree upon some common objectives. One of these agreed objectives is to reach
an overall employment rate of 70% (and 60% for women) by 2010, something which is
likely to have a particularly strong impact on the conservative welfare states. Another
objective, diffused throughout the European Employment Guidelines, is to attain a new
balance between individual and collective responsibility in employment and unemployment
(Bonvin and Burnay, 2000). Nothing is said about how to achieve these two goals.
Nevertheless, what is striking, as indicated by Scharpf (2000), is the overwhelming
agreement on the employment guidelines, despite the wide spectrum of national
employment policies across the Union, ranging from the solidarity-orientated policies in
France (Tholoniat, 2000) to the individualist policies in the United Kingdom (Kenner,
1999). Agreement has been possible partly because the quantitative objectives were initially
very general and broad, enabling them to win common support from the Member States.
An additional explanation could be the voluntary, technical and “depoliticised” logic of the
approach, where one of the principal objectives has been to launch a learning process and
trust-building among the players involved (2).
3.2 Social Benchmarking after the Lisbon Summit
Benchmarking in the social field is still more recent, having been set in motion – in its
most recent version – during the Lisbon Summit (2000). We need to recall why the
benchmarking of social policies within the EU has been raised at all. It is primarily because,
against the background of the integration of monetary policy and the close coordination of
macro-economic policy, along with a general commitment to promoting supply-side
policies for flexibility and employability, national and EU authorities have recognised the
need to work together on policies for social cohesion. This recognition is driven partly by
political factors: pressure from the trade unions in face of the deflationary impact of EMU
and the political goals of the left-of-centre governments that now dominate the EU. It is,
equally, driven by recognition of the linkages between economic, monetary and labour
market policies on the one hand, and employment, social protection and social cohesion
                                               
2. In some of the background documents prepared by experts for the Commission, these “technical”
procedures have been elaborated in the form of the “radar charts” familiar in the benchmarking
literature of the commercial world: see, for example, Tronti (1998); Mosley and Mayer (1998). However,
this approach seems now to be going out of favour with the Commission.
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policies on the other: the latter cannot be left to be managed at national level alone, given
their consequences for the former.
Social Protection
Social protection has come a long way since the two Council recommendations of
1992, the first aiming at a convergence of social protection, the second at a definition of
sufficient resources in social assistance systems (Council of the European Union, 1992a,
1992b). The method of implementation proposed at the time resembles a premature
version of OMC, consisting of regular reporting on the steps taken in the Member States,
measured according to appropriate criteria, agreed upon with the Member States: five years
later, however, there was no hint of any progress in the formulation of a common method
(CEC, 1999).  Nevertheless, the 1995, 1997 and 1999 communications on social protection,
particularly the latter, have progressively raised social protection on the European agenda,
and have contributed positively to a common understanding of European social protection
(de la Porte, 1999a), something that is a prerequisite for effective benchmarking. The
turning point was the strong politically-orientated four-pillar objective set out in the 1999
social protection communication, aiming at concerted improvement in all Member States in
the areas of employment (to make work pay), poverty and social exclusion, pensions and
health care.
In justifying the need for the European Union to intervene in the area of social
protection, explicit reference is made to EMU and to the employment strategy, which are
considered as ideal models of European institutional coordination. A social protection
committee, reminiscent of the employment committee, was set up during the Finnish
Presidency at the end of 1999, endowed with the task of activating the social protection
strategy. It was thereafter formalised during the Nice Summit, and was integrated into the
Treaty (article 144). In the socially-orientated political atmosphere after Lisbon, the long-
term aim was to draw up European guidelines for social protection, which would be
implemented in the same manner as the Employment Guidelines. The strategy would
involve strengthening cooperation in the field of social protection to meet common
challenges; setting common objectives that are ambitious and realistic, using clear
indicators whenever possible; ensuring the necessary flexibility for Member States to be
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able to implement their respective policies; and closer cooperation among Member States,
based on the exchange of experience and best practice.
However, this programme is far from being realised. The principal reason is that
Member States fear an intrusion of the European Union into their national arrangements.
In the Nice Treaty, the Heads of State and Government therefore stipulated that the EU
policies “shall not affect the right of Member States to define the fundamental principles of
their social security systems and must not significantly affect the financial equilibrium
thereof” (article 144). Another reason is that the comparative statistics on social protection
which are available, for example through the European System of Integrated Social
Protection Statistics (Esspros), provide a general but rather unclear picture of the social
protection patterns throughout the EU. It is only now that the weaknesses and gaps of
these systems as valid comparative instruments are being seriously analysed (CEC, 2000a).
There is also the problem that definitions of social protection vary according to national
context, even if it is generally agreed that statutory, occupational and fiscal schemes should
all be included (Berghman, 1997) and account should be taken of mandatory private
spending, direct taxation on social transfers, indirect taxation on consumption of social
services and fiscal advantages accorded to certain disadvantaged groups (Adema, 1998).
The fundamental difficulty lies in the differences in conception and arrangement of
the welfare state among the EU fifteen, with national social protection systems being
embedded within specific institutional structures (Berghman, 1997; Ferrera et al., 2000). In
contrast to the sphere of monetary policy, here there is no hegemon capable of enforcing a
single vision of social objectives. Some social objectives can, it is true, be argued by
reference to the imperatives of the single market, but these rarely have sufficient precision
to silence debate. Policy objectives remain in considerable measure a matter for the
national authorities, even if their sovereignty and autonomy in social policy have been
constrained (Leibfried and Pierson, 1995). The contrast with the monetary field is therefore
even more marked than in the case of employment policy.
Given this situation, the instrument that has in practice been prioritised is that of
dialogue: cooperation rather than coordination is under way. This involves the exchange of
views that is supposed to be beneficial to all Member States; but there are no common
objectives, no guidelines, no recommendations, no peer review, no sanctions.   In the field
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of pensions it has been decided to apply the OMC, but it remains to be seen what
benchmarks can be agreed (Math and Pochet, forthcoming 2001/2). What is striking,
moreover, is the institutional competition between the Economic Policy, Social Protection
and Employment Committees, and the corresponding Councils and Directorates-General
of the Commission, to shape the agenda of pension coordination and benchmarking.
Poverty and Social Exclusion
Notwithstanding these difficulties, poverty and social exclusion have been singled out
as a quasi-separate area of action and as a common challenge for Europe. The promotion
of social inclusion is to be carried out through the OMC. During the French Presidency,
the objectives were defined and endorsed by the Nice European Council. The strategy
consists of promoting participation in employment and providing access to resources,
rights, goods and services for all European citizens, preventing the risks of exclusion and
helping the most vulnerable (Labour and Social Affairs Council, 2000). The strategy also
involves integrating the solidarity principle into Member States' employment, education and
training, health and housing policies ("mainstreaming") and defining priority actions for
specific target groups (such as minorities, children, the aged and people with disabilities).
The choice of the most appropriate actions remains in the hands of the Member States.
Taking these objectives into account, each Member State was required by June 2001 to
present a national action plan to combat poverty and social exclusion, including the
national level indicators that have been selected to take account of the multi-dimensionality
of the phenomenon, and to measure progress in relation to national and regional targets
and the overall European objectives. Peer review and supranational monitoring and
evaluation are an integral part of the exercise, creating pressure to converge towards
European level objectives. The exercise is to be repeated on a bi-annual basis.
The most sensitive issue is the establishment of commonly agreed indicators. The
social protection committee has been seeking to define clearer long-term policy objectives
and indicators for monitoring the situation (de la Porte, 1999b: 33). As in the case of the
employment strategy, benchmarks will include performance indicators (comparison with
the average of the best performers among the EU) and policy indicators (measuring the
degree of effort carried out by individual Member States). As in the case of social
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protection more generally, however, weaknesses and gaps in existing systems of
comparative statistics will need to be addressed, requiring improved analysis of the
characteristics, causes, processes and development of social exclusion. Although efforts are
being made to improve the quality of the data, new and relevant data will only be available
in a few years.
The official documents emphasised that the fight against social exclusion is the
primary responsibility of Member States and of their national, regional and local
authorities. The Community Action Programme which was proposed in 2000 is conceived
as being an element of added value to these national level activities, in order to activate and
enhance the exchange of information and best practices among Member States (CEC,
2000b). Rather than financing some isolated projects, as was formerly the case, the
programme will support coordinated research efforts, especially concerning the definition
of common indicators, networking and structural financing of representative organisations
(CEC, 2000b: 4-5). The role of the Community level is also to support evaluation and
monitoring by peers, which is intended to produce a mutual exchange of lessons, while the
Council is important in setting the overall objectives for actions to combat poverty.
Finally, the fight against social exclusion is to take place through an integrated
approach, based on partnerships, the participation of all those concerned and by
promotion of processes of individual reintegration at the micro-level. This is turn explains
the central role given to dialogue and the exchange of information and best practices, to be
stimulated by the organisation of colloquia, meetings and networks, organised in
collaboration with the Presidency of the Union (CEC, 2000b: 4-5).
4. Policy Learning and Governance
The foregoing discussion poses two questions fundamental for theorising EU policy-
making. First, what is the relationship between policy learning and policy coordination:
how far does the former depend upon agreed objectives for the latter? Second, what are
the implications for processes of governance? In addressing both of these questions, we
seek to expose the theoretical and policy dilemmas which social benchmarking poses.
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4.1 Social Benchmarking, Coordination and Policy Learning
We have contrasted coordination in the monetary, employment and social fields, in
terms of the strong hegemonic role played in the former by the German monetary
authorities. The objectives and benchmarks which they defined and the political leverage
they were able to bring to the process of monetary unification drove out dissent, with the
political classes in each of the aspirant members of Euroland subordinating other policy
interests to this one overriding national objective.
In the employment and, even more, in the social field, there is, we have argued, no
such hegemon, enforcing a single vision of the challenges which confront the EU Member
States. That assertion is not strictly correct.  The very success of monetary policy
coordination now poses its own threat to social benchmarking: hegemonic spill-over from
those actors whose own political legitimacy has been reinforced by monetary union. The
Ecofin Council and the Economic Policy Committee in particular have been attempting to
influence the definition of benchmarks across the different sectors with which the Lisbon
Summit was concerned (Ecofin Council, 2000; and EPC, 2000). Not only does this risk
imposing, as ostensible technical necessities, common social objectives which override
national political choices: it risks doing so on terms that privilege fiscal discipline over
social needs and social cohesion. To this extent, the ‘technical’ character of current
benchmarking processes in the social field, while it may serve to build trust and stronger
forms of concertation, risks doing so in an arena which obscures the social political choices
at stake.  To contest this hegemony of fiscal discipline, however, is to accept that no
coherent social vision is currently available: on the contrary, the legacy of diverse welfare
regimes makes for significantly different visions, embedded in different institutional and
political domestic settlements.
Where does this leave European social benchmarking? Where there are no common
objectives, or where those that are enunciated are so loose as to be almost meaningless,
does it follow that no benchmarking is possible? As noted earlier, benchmarking in many
cases arises, bottom-up, as the initiative of a particular organisation, eager to assess and to
better its performance. This is most obviously the case with a commercial enterprise,
benchmarking its competitors and using their best performance as the standard by which
to judge itself. However, individual countries can also do this. In the case of social policy,
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therefore, each EU member state might benchmark other Member States by reference to
its own policies. This would exploit the value of benchmarking as a tool for raising
standards of performance, while at the same time recognising the diversity of national
policy objectives.
Such bottom-up benchmarking could still involve a role for the EU institutions.
Although nationally-driven, bottom-up benchmarking might nevertheless involve the cycle
of EU reporting and peer review that already characterises OMC in the area of social
exclusion Moreover, the EU institutions – in particular the European Commission – could
play a technical role in ensuring that the Member States had available to them information
about best practice in each other’s territories; and they could ensure that these information
resources were organised in an efficient manner, to avoid duplication of effort. Finally, the
Commission could offer expert commentary on the national reports and facilitate peer
review. The value of this bottom-up benchmarking would also be enhanced if the EU
institutions were to strengthen learning capacity across the Community in respect of policy
innovation and improvement. The various programmes of cross-national innovation and
policy learning that the Commission has long supported in the social field provide a
number of models on which this capacity-building could build (Room, 1986,1993).
This is, arguably, the approach to social benchmarking that is being adopted in the
aftermath of the Nice Summit, for example in relation to social exclusion and poverty.
Nevertheless, bottom-up benchmarking and cross-national policy learning, to be effective,
need to be driven to a substantial extent by the policy actors in the individual countries
concerned. Coordination here must involve decentralised learning networks rather than the
hegemonic imposition of a monolithic discipline. National governments and other actors at
national level – professional and practitioner networks, policy evaluation think-tanks,
training organisations for social actors – have a key role to play: not so much as guardians
of national sovereignty, checking that the principle of subsidiarity is not infringed, but
rather as interpreters between sub-national actors and organisations on the one hand, the
array of good (and bad) practices across the other Member States on the other hand.
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4.2 Social Benchmarking and Governance
EMU and the European Employment Strategy were the precursors of the open
method of coordination and EU social benchmarking. However, their implementation also
highlighted fundamental questions of EU governance. Monetary union, which we have
taken as the purest case of supranational coordination, was itself dependent on an
agreement by Member States to adopt a common policy objective: the hegemony of the
German monetary authorities would have had little substance but for that political
commitment by governments (Woolley, 1992). However, this sort of commitment requires
heroic acts of political leadership by the countries concerned. In the case of monetary
union, the economic promise suggested by the paradigmatic German case was vital for
political leaders’ efforts to maintain popular acquiescence in a period of austere public
finances. So attractive was this promise, that it enabled these leaders to lock their countries
into long-term commitments to monetary discipline, embodied in the Maastricht Treaty,
from which it would be exceedingly difficult and costly to extricate themselves.
However, the political commitment to EMU generated a renewed debate about EU
governance in a rapidly changing world. The European Union has recognised that it is
urgent to develop a common understanding of governance in the EU: hence the timeliness
of the forthcoming White Paper on Governance, one of whose aims is to promote new
forms of European governance (CEC, 2000c). The soft processes involved in OMC,
emphasising transparency, accountability and effectiveness, would seem to have an obvious
relevance to principles of good governance. OMC also seems well-attuned to the currently
fashionable debates on “multi-level governance”, with the actions of independent public
actors at different levels articulated with each other to reach shared objectives.
We have pointed to some of the ways in which, even in the social field, the Member
States have sought to move to certain common objectives. This also raises important
questions of governance. This is, not least, because the development of OMC has been
accompanied by various forms of resistance and tension among the actors involved. The
recommendations made by the Commission to Member States are sometimes resented, and
the Commission is in some instances seen as putting pressure on Member States to follow
a specific policy line. Public scrutiny and debate are likely to be crucial, if processes of
policy cooperation and coordination in the social field are to be politically feasible. Without
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this national democratic debate, some players could and would use Europe as a scapegoat
to implement politically sensitive changes at national level, as was the case for EMU.
Moreover, where there is little or no scope for scrutiny and critical debate, the reporting by
national authorities to the EU institutions can become extraordinarily anodyne. This can
lead to the whole process of performance monitoring and reporting being discredited. As
Scharpf (2000, p.xxx) argues in relation to the employment strategy: “the danger is that the
’National Action Plan’ will merely restate what governments are doing anyway, and that the
learning effect of deliberations at European level may only educate international ‘liaison‘
officials who lack effective power at home”. The challenge is how to reconcile diversity and
democratic accountability, on the one hand, with convergence and efficiency, on the other
hand.
We have argued that even where there are no common social objectives, nationally-
driven, bottom-up benchmarking could be a useful vehicle for cross-national policy
learning. It is therefore important to consider what would be the implications of processes
such as these for national and EU governance. This question can be addressed by
considering what sanctions and incentives could be attached to this process of bottom-up
social benchmarking. At one level, these sanctions would be similar to those in the case of
employment policy: countries which fail to meet the benchmarks – and they would after all
be benchmarks which they had themselves chosen – would be subject to the moral censure
of their fellow governments. However, at least as important would be the degree of
involvement of the domestic constituencies of each national government in enforcing
sanctions and rewards. “Good governance” would mean a high degree of involvement for
the public in scrutinising the policy areas which political leaders choose for benchmarking,
the best practices which they identify in other Member States, and the efforts which they
then make to improve national performance. Indicators, targets and procedures would not
be imposed from outside or from above, but debated more openly. Under such scrutiny,
domestic political leaders – in government or opposition – would no longer be able to rely
on the relative ignorance of their population regarding practices elsewhere: they would,
instead, need to justify their own performance by comparison with best practice in other
countries. Social benchmarking of the sort envisaged here would then have crucial
consequences for their political credibility.
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If, even without agreement on specific common objectives, ‘bottom-up’ social
benchmarking of this sort were to be made obligatory, along with processes of public
scrutiny and debate, this would constitute a powerful commitment to good governance on
the part of the EU. This is, at least in embryo, what the OMC involves. It would do more
than this, however: for while it would affirm national responsibility, it would also affirm
Community interest in how that national responsibility is exercised. Even where there are
no major and demonstrable consequences of national policies for other Member States or
for other areas of Community policy, the Community is recognised as having an interest in
good governance for all citizens of the Union. This raises profound questions as to the
nature of the EU as a supranational political community.
It could also have consequences for the political credibility of the EU itself. It was
suggested earlier that to rush into social benchmarking by reference to common objectives
which are only vague or illusory could risk the whole exercise being discredited, not least in
the eyes of the populations of the various EU countries. In contrast, social benchmarking
of the sort envisaged here would promote better domestic governance, as a return on the
investment which countries make in European collaboration. This could provide the means
which political leaders require, in order to demonstrate eloquently to their populations the
positive benefits of European integration.
Such a demonstration could in turn, indeed, enable a move to greater agreement on
common objectives, and hence to social coordination, and not just cooperation, through
the OMC. This is consistent with Biagi’s argument in relation to the sphere of employment:
“Consistent application of the Luxembourg exercise might lead to a convergence of
Member States' employment policies, not dictated by Brussels but based on growing
consensus on effective solutions through a process of trial and error” (Biagi, 2000: 159).
Thus, even where, in contrast to monetary union, the “pressures for convergence” coming
from above are only weak, the ‘pressures for accountability’ coming from below, as the
fruit of the building of good governance, may serve to sustain the pace of cross-national
policy learning through the OMC.
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5. Conclusion
The EU, acting as a ‘semi-sovereign’ policy system, “seems slowly but surely to be
carving out for itself a distinct co-ordinating role in a number of social policy areas – a role
that can work to rebalance ‘softly’ and ‘from below’ the structural asymmetry between
negative and positive integration” (Ferrera et al., 2000: 65).  The OMC can be characterised
as a “post-regulatory” approach to governance, in which there is a preference for
procedures or general standards with wide margins for variation, rather than detailed and
non-flexible (legally binding) rules. It is by intensive consultation, mainly among Member
State representatives, that standards – non-rigid in that they are adapted to different
institutional arrangements, legal regimes and national contexts – are set and modified
(Mosher, 2000). The term “vertical decentralisation” – a supple application of rules by
players at the appropriate level, according to local contexts (CEC, 2000d: 6) – captures the
essence of the process. In addition to the suppleness in the spatial dimension, there is also
considerable malleability in the temporal dimension, in that Member States can move at
different speeds in reforming policy.
The areas to which the OMC is applied – including social inclusion – are ones which
were traditionally thorny, not only in the sense of being jealously protected, as matters of
national sovereignty, but also as being areas where effective policies can only with
difficulty be devised. The OMC, it may be argued, is alert to both of these issues: it avoids
centralised supranational governance, so that it can cater appropriately for national
diversity, and it “institutionalises the sharing of Member States’ experiences with reform
experiments.” (Mosher, 2000, p.xxx)  Nevertheless, the analysis in this paper reveals that
matters are not quite so simple. This has implications both for the practical politics of the
OMC and for its theorisation.
5.1 The Practical Politics of Social Benchmarking and the OMC
First, we have argued that recent moves to policy coordination, including the OMC,
have in substantial measure been inspired by the experience of EMU. However, this is a
perilous paradigm on which to base social benchmarking and the OMC, if it suggests that
common objectives can be used as the basis for the benchmarking process. Instead, we
argued that social benchmarking must in general be “bottom-up”. Failure to recognise
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this difference would pose a number of dangers. On the one hand, it could bring the EU
institutions into disrepute with the populations of the various Member States, resentful of
European disciplines whose rationale they doubt. Equally, the EMU paradigm makes it
more likely that European social objectives will be defined by relation to fiscal goals and
the requirements of market competitiveness, rather than by reference to social needs: this
seems to be a likely consequence of the strong role which the Ecofin Council is playing in
the definition of benchmarks.  The principal political actors who are driving the OMC in
the social field seem to be alert to some of these dangers and they are arguably promoting
a ‘bottom-up’ model of social benchmarking, notably in the field of poverty and social
exclusion. Nevertheless, the situation is not at all clear and the ‘bottom-up’ model is
evidenced principally by the permissive approach which the supra-national coordination
is adopting towards the preparation of the national action plans against poverty and social
exclusion (Social Protection Committee, 2001).
Second, we have argued that the OMC raises fundamental questions of governance.
Monetary union provides one model of supranational governance, involving the hegemony
of the German monetary authorities, but underpinned by strong political leadership in all
the participating countries. In the social field in contrast, there is no such hegemonic
definition of common goals, nor is there sufficient political commitment across the
Member States to create such goals. Rather than being driven by pressures for convergence
coming from above, bottom-up social benchmarking requires both for its political
legitimation, and for its dynamic to be sustained, that it be accompanied by processes of
public scrutiny and debate: pressures for accountability coming from below. This does not
mean that political leadership must surrender to populist whim. What it does mean is a
high degree of involvement for the public in scrutinising the policy areas which political
leaders choose for benchmarking, the best practices which they identify in other Member
States, and the efforts which they then make to improve national performance.
In the practical development of the OMC there are plenty of references to the role of
the social partners, non-governmental organisations, regional and local authorities (see,
for example, Social Protection Committee, 2001). What is less clear, at the present stage,
is the form that this role will take and the real, rather than merely symbolic, forms of
public scrutiny that will be institutionalised. In the absence of effective scrutiny it will be
easy for Member States to make and implement unpopular policies, under the auspices of
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the EU, while themselves avoiding blame. So also, unless there is a substantial level of
engagement by other stakeholders, notably those of civil society, the OMC could lead to
inaction, given the fairly loose manner in which it allows Member States to select their
own policy priorities.
Towards what sort of social Europe might the OMC lead, if it is interpreted and
implemented in the form of this ‘bottom-up’ social benchmarking, drawing its dynamic
from the pressures for accountability coming from below, instead of pressures for
convergence generated from above? One possibility is a social Europe with only a vague
definition of common social goals, but characterised at the national level by rapidly
improvement standards of policy performance, based on intensive cross-national
benchmarking and policy learning conducted in the full glare of public debate. This might
however be a social Europe where, although standards of performance are converging,
the detailed policy goals are not. Rather, a lively public debate at local, regional, national
and European levels, albeit within limits set by the requirements of single market
compatibility, permits communities to develop a range of different welfare futures.
It is, however, at least as likely that pressures for accountability would themselves
become pressures for convergence, even in countries where opinion with regard to the EU
tends to be less than positive. Public scrutiny would bring to attention not only the
technical means that neighbouring countries use for the delivery of social policies, but also
the goals that they adopt. ‘Spill-over’ from these technical comparisons into a convergence
of social goals would be likely, but in terms of general public debate and sentiment, rather
than being confined of the political and administrative leaders directly involved in the
management of EU affairs. Cross-national policy learning involving this wider public is
more likely to stimulate political demands for catching up with the best, rather than for
pursuing idiosyncratic national welfare strategies. There is a second sort of ‘spill-over’ that
this process could also generate: not only some real convergence in the social goals which
local and national communities in the EU embrace, but also in the credibility attaching to
the supranational institutions of social Europe themselves. This is because European social
benchmarking of the sort envisaged here, if it promotes better domestic governance, would
demonstrate powerfully the positive benefits of European integration.  Nevertheless, to
proceed in this way is likely to require major acts of political leadership by the governments
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of the Member States, not least in regards to the forms of domestic governance over which
they currently preside.
5.2 Theoretical Implications
The foregoing analysis can, finally, be related to several broader strands of theoretical
literature, which illuminate the developments we have traced but which are also
themselves placed in a new light.
First, the OMC is a form of policy coordination, albeit one which takes place within
a polity endowed with a variety of intergovernmental and supranational modes of
decision-making. It can therefore be viewed by reference to the substantial literature on
policy coordination.   Peters (1998), reviewing the theoretical debates on policy
coordination as the product of hierarchy, markets and networks, explores, in particular,
the role of networks in policy coordination and the implications for more participatory
forms of governance.  The distinction we have drawn between “benchmarking from
above” and “benchmarking from below” explores the practical dilemmas which
organisational coordination poses within the multi-tiered policy-making arena of the EU.
Yetit also poses as a question something that Peters tends to take for granted:
coordination for what?  The Lisbon  Summit affirms that a wide range of policies,
hitherto protected as national prerogatives, are significant instruments in the drive for a
“dynamic knowledge-based economy”. Instead, this paper has traced the practical
political difficulties in defining common goals in many of these policy areas.   We have
argued that what is coordinated may be less the policies themselves, than the processes of
cross-national benchmarking and organisational learning, by means of which citizens are
provided with improved standards of domestic policy performance.
Secondly, our analysis suggests that ‘bottom-up’ social benchmarking should be
conceived not as a looser version of ‘top-down’ benchmarking, but rather as having a
logic of its own: involving decentralised learning networks, driven to a substantial extent
by the policy actors in the individual countries.  This analysis can, in turn, be related to
the larger literature on organisational learning, stressing the role of decentralised learning
networks, open to a variety of actors with their distinct agendas, as against traditional
models of centre-periphery learning (see Schon, 1971; Room, 1986: Chapter 7; Senge,
– 25 –
1990).  It can also be related to the literature on cross-national policy transfer and lesson-
drawing (see, for example, Bennett, 1991; Dolowitz and March, 1996; Evans and Davies,
1999).
Third, our analysis is relevant to the larger theoretical debate in the international
relations literature, as to the indispensability or otherwise of a hegemon for securing
international cooperation (Keohane, 1984).  We have argued that while the policy
coordination of EMU relied on such a hegemon, and while this has in turn bestowed a
certain hegemonic role on the Ecofin Council and the Economic Policy Committee, this
only risks bringing the OMC into disrepute in the social area: scrutiny and accountability
from below are likely here to be crucial preconditions for the legitimation and sustenance
of policy coordination. In the absence of hegemony, this leaves an active role for national
and even sub-national actors, in driving the process of social benchmarking across the
European Union.  Such a role can then, for example, be related to the analysis of two-
level games in the international relations literature (Evans et al, 1993). That literature
focuses primarily on the strategies employed by national negotiators in pursuit of
international agreements, which then require ratification by domestic constituencies.
Here, in contrast, just as important are the strategies of sub-national actors, deploying
EU-wide benchmarking and policy comparisons, and perhaps even constructing cross-
national alliances with their peers elsewhere, in order to refashion or “recalibrate”
national welfare settlements (Ferrera et al, 2000; cf Evans et al, 1993, pp 31-2, 418-423).
Finally, our analysis can be related to the literature on the governance of international
and supranational organisations, the EU in particular.  Scharpf (1997, Chapter 9) provides
a bleak prognosis of the legitimation and governance problems of the EU. He argues that
while actions at European level which are associated with negative integration – the
removal of barriers to a common market – can readily be legitimated by reference to the
original Treaties, this does not extend to those associated with positive integration,
including much of social policy.  Legitimation of the latter depends upon an institutional
infrastructure of democratic accountability and an EU-wide collective identity, yet these
are not in prospect.  He concludes that “normatively convincing, practically effective and
politically feasible solutions are nowhere in sight” (Scharpf, 1997, p 213).
– 26 –
Our analysis is more positive.  Acknowledging that in the social sphere it is difficult
to legitimate common objectives and a system of ‘benchmarking from above’, we sought
to analyse ‘bottom-up benchmarking’, drawing its dynamic from the pressures for
accountability coming from below.  We proceeded to argue that such a form of social
benchmarking, mediated by the EU, was likely in turn to strengthen the legitimacy of the
EU itself; and was likely then to spill over into a real convergence of the social goals to
which local and national communities across the EU aspire.  This argument is consistent
with some of the theoretical and policy debates spawned by the forthcoming White Paper
on EU governance.  Lebessis and Paterson (2001), for example, argue that actions at
European level which are associated with positive integration require new forms of
engagement downwards with civil society.   However, as they further argue, such
engagement, unless it addresses the unequal capacity of such diverse actors to engage with
EU policy-making, will be empty.
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